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CONMENrs
more than a civil contract, it is an institution, the social importance of
which is evidenced by the existence of state laws to govern its in-
ception and dissolution. Thus in order to protect the institution of
marriage the majority of courts would have denied the annulment.
However, it should be obvious that greater protection of the institution
resulted from the Court's decision granting the annulment. The
institution of marriage. This is also true of annulment statutes applied
nulment in a case like Parks where the marriage has almost no
chance of success and would not have taken place but for the fraud
of the defendant. Fraud has no place in either a "civil" or "sacred"
contract. Every state in the union has enacted divorce laws intended to
reflect, satisfy and secure society's demand for the protection of the
institution of marriage. This is also true of annulment statutes applied
by the courts when, because of considerations of policy, equity and
justice, they are the more appropriate remedy. Because society loses
by perpetuating marriages under the circumstances of the Parks case,
the annulment was properly granted.
It is impossible to determine what the significance and impact of
this decision will be. However, it is nonetheless significant and may
well indicate that a change in society's view and attitude toward mar-
riage is beginning to be reflected in court decisions. Hopefully this
decision does indicate the beginning of a trend because it seems to
evidence a more enlightened, realistic and humanitarian view of
marriage in which there is not only concern for the protection and
welfare of the institution but also for the individuals involved. This
view not only recognizes the individual's and society's interest in the
marital relationship but also their interest that the relationship be
happy and successful. Thus, while it may still be necessary in a
particular case to protect and defend the institution at the expense of
the individuals involved, their interests should be an important con-
sideration in every decision.
Andrew M. Winkler
TORTS-NELIGENCE-NEGLiGENCE PER SE AS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF IN-
juRy iN "FALL-DowN" CAsEs.-Herbert R. Franklin was injured when
he lost his footing and fell down a flight of stairs in a building, part
of which was leased by Blue Grass Restaurant Co., Inc. The stairway
was not equipped with handrails as required by a Lexington city
ordinance. Franklin failed to testify as to what caused him to slip,
but he did state that as he started to fall he threw out his arms in an
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effort to take hold of a banister or handrail. The implication was that
if a handrail had been there, he might have been able to avoid the
fall and the resultant injuries. The restaurant did not question the
charge that its failure to provide handrails was negligence per se. It
contended, rather, that the stairway and the absence of handrails were
clearly visible to Franklin and that the proximate cause of his in-
juries was not the absence of handrails, but his own misstep. Under
an instruction that Franklin had a right to use the stairway, but that
he had a duty to use reasonable care in traversing the stairs, the jury
found him free of negligence and awarded him a verdict. The
restaurant appealed. Held: The failure to comply with the ordinance
was a proximate cause of the injury. The jury's finding wvith respect
to Franklin's alleged contributory negligence was not clearly erroneous
and therefore must be sustained.1 Blue Grass Restaurant Co. v.
Franklin, 424 S.W.2d 594 (Ky. 1968).
It is a long-settled maxim in Kentucky tort law that the violation of
a municipal ordinance is negligence per se if the injured party was a
member of a class of persons intended to be protected by the
ordinance and the injury was the type the ordinance was designed to
prevent.2 It is also well settled, however, that for such negligence to
be actionable, it must be the proximate cause of the injury sustained.3
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, like most other courts, has been hard-
pressed to accurately define "proximate cause." Perhaps the most
concise statement of Kentucky law in this regard was formulated by
the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in
1The appeal was also based on a separate issue concerning the landlord/
tenant relationship between the restaurant and Eastman Investment Company,
which owned the building where the restaurant and stairs were located. Blue
Grass also lost on this issue due to the existence of an indemnifying clause in the
lease.
2For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the negligence per
se doctrine in Kentucky, see Kepner, Violation of a Municipal Ordinance as
Negligence Per Se in Kentucky, 37 Ky. L.J. 358 (1949). For a more condensed
study of this subject, see Note Torts-A Summary and Critique of the Law of
Statutory Negligence in Kentucky, 38 Ky. L.J. 479 (1950).
3 Illinois C. Ry. v. Swift, 233 F. 2d 766 (6th Cir. 1966); Home Ins. Co. v.
Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1966); Marmor v. Marmor, 409 S.W.2d
526 (Ky. 1966); Nett v. Zellars, 353 S.W.2d 379 (Ky. 1962); Mountain Petroleum
Co. v. Howard, 351 S.W.2d 178 (Ky. 1961); Milliken v. Union Light, Heat &
Power Co., 341 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1960); Ross v. Jones, 316 S.W.2d 845 (Ky.
1958); Commonwealth v. Ragland Potter Co., 305 S.W.2d 915 (Ky. 1957);
Jewell v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955); Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas, 307
Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1948); Brown Hotel Co. v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209
S.W.2d 70 (1948); Phoenix Amusement Co. v. Padgets Adm'x, 301 Ky. 338,
192 S.W.2d 105 (1946); Murphy v. Homans, 286 Ky. 191, 150 S.W.2d 14
(1940); Myers v. Salyer, 277 Ky. 696, 127 S.W.2d 158 (1939); Pryors Admr
v. Otter, 268 Ky. 602, 105 S.W.2d 564 (1937); Wright v. Clausen, 263 Ky. 298,
92 S.W.2d 93 (1936).
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Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton,4 wherein, after sifting through the ap-
plicable Kentucky cases, the court concluded:
The Kentucky Court of Appeals defines the proximate cause of an in-
jury as that which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
independent responsible cause, produces injury. . . . It must be such
that it induced the injury and without which the accident could not
have occurred....5
In Kentucky, proximate cause is a question of fact and will be left to
the jury unless the facts are not only undisputed, but the inference to
be drawn from them is such that fair-minded men ought not to differ
about them." Juries, however, are not permitted to speculate as to
proximate cause but must base their decisions on competent evidence
presented at trial.7 Circumstantial evidence may suffice to prove
proximate cause, but the circumstances must preclude a reasonable
inference that the accident could have been caused in any other
manner." The requirement of proximate cause precludes recovery
where the negligence merely created a condition which makes it pos-
sible for an injury to occur through some independent cause.9 It has
been said, ... [N] egligence does not cause accidents .... [It] creates
the conditions out of which they arise."'10 But if the subsequent act
of another "grows out of and naturally flows from the condition," it is
not an independent force or intervening cause."- Although foresee-
ability is an aspect to be considered, it is not necessary that the
negligent party foresee the specific subsequent act in the chain of
causation.' 2 Contributory negligence, of course, is a bar to recovery in
actions growing out of negligence per se just as in other negligence
cases;' 3 but it would be a fallacy to say that evidence of contributory
negligence has been given as much weight in such cases as in cases
where the original negligence grew out of something other than a
4 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1966).
5 Id. at 756.
6Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E. D. Ky. 1966); Jewell
v. Dell, 284 S.W.2d 92 (Ky. 1955); Murphy v. Homans, 286 Ky. 191, 150
S.W.2d 14 (1940); Stevens' Admr v. Watt, 266 Ky. 608, 99 S.W.2d 753 (1937);
Louisville & N.R.R. v. Cooper, 164 Ky. 489, 175 S.W. 1034 (1915).
7 Phoenix Amusement Co. v. Padgett's Adm'x, 301 Ky. 338, 192 S.W.2d 105
(1946).
8 id.
9 Milliken v. Union Light, Heat & Power Co., 341 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1960);
Brown Hotel Co. v. Levitt, 306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W.2d 70 (1948).
1o United Fuel Gas Co. v. Thacker, 372 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Ky. 1963).
"1 Seelbach v. Cadick, 405 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Ky. 1966).
12Id.; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Thacker, 372 S.W.2d 784 (Ky. 1963).
13 Durham v. Maratta, 302 Ky. 633. 195 S.W.2d 277 (1946); Bodgers v.
Stoller, 284 Ky. 108, 143 S.W.2d 1047 (1940); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Cooper, 164
Ky. 489, 175 S.W. 1034 (1915).
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violation of statutory duty.14 The apparent reason for this is that in
many negligence per se cases, the statute or ordinance violated was
intended to protect individuals from their own carelessness in certain
dangerous situations. 15
The Kentucky decisions in so-called "fall-down" cases involving
negligence per se, such as we have in Blue Grass Restaurant, have
generally followed the principles just outlined. 1 6 In Rodgers v. Stoller,1
7
the plaintiff fell down a flight of stairs while attempting to walk down
an unlighted hallway in the apartment building where she lived. A
city ordinance required that such hallways be lighted. The Court held
that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law
even though she knowingly entered a place of danger, reasoning that
although she had a duty to exercise due care for her own safety, she
was not required to use the hall at night at her own peril. This case
was followed by three fall-down cases not involving negligence per
se, but providing some guidance with regard to the question of proxi-
mate cause. In Seelbach, Inc. v. Mellman 18 and Tate v. Canary Cot-
tage,19 the respective plaintiffs were found contributorily negligent for
not using the provided handrails even though they were aware of the
dangerous conditions created by the negligent acts of the defendants.
In Phoenix Amusement Co. v. Padgett's Adn'x,20 recovery was denied
because there was no proof that the decedent had stumbled at the
exact spot where the defendant's negligence had created a dangerous
condition, and because there was conflicting evidence as to whether
death had resulted from the fall or from injuries suffered at the hands
of an unknown assailant several weeks earlier.
Durham v. Maratta,21 decided in 1946, is the most significant Ken-
tucky case dealing with negligence per se and proximate cause in fall-
down situations, primarily because of the language used therein. The
plaintiff was injured while descending stairs which were not properly
lighted as required by city ordinance. At trial, she was ruled contri-
butorily negligent as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed
14 Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 253 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. Ky. 1966);
Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1948); Durham v.
Maratta, 802 Ky. 633, 195 S.W.2d 277 (1946); Rodgers v. Stoller, 284 Ky. 108,
143 S.W.2d 1047 (1940).
15 Cf. Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas, 307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1948);
Rodgers v. Stoller, 284 Ky. 108, 143 S.W.2d 1047 (1940).
16 It is interesting to note that prior to the appeal in Blue Grass Restaurant,
the Court had not been faced with a fall-down case since 1948. The seven cases
discussed infra in the text were all decided between 1940 and 1948.
17284 Ky. 108, 143 S.W.2d 1047 (1940).
18293 Ky. 790, 170 S.W.2d 18 (1943).
19 302 Ky. 313, 194 S.W.2d 663 (1946).
20301 Ky. 338, 192 S.W.2d 105 (1946).
21302 Ky. 633, 195 S.W.2d 277 (1946).
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holding that she had a right to descend the steps even though she
knew it was dark, and that it was for the jury to determine whether
she was contributorily negligent. Citing Ruling Case Law, 22 the
Court's precise words were:
If the injury complained of is one which was intended to be prevented
by the Statute and Ordinance .. the violation of their provisions must
be considered as the proximate cause of the injury .... There can be no
question that the Statute and Ordinance above quoted were intended
to prevent a person using steps in an apartment house from falling in
the darkness.
23
It is difficult to see how the Court could have made a more unam-
biguous statement in regard to the law on this point. Durham was
explicitly followed in Greyhound Terminal v. Thomas.24 There, the
plaintiff's shoe caught in "something" which caused her to stumble and
fall down the steps. She, like Mr. Franklin, reached for a handrail
only to find that none had been provided. In finding for the plaintiff,
the Court quoted the above passage from Durham.
But Durham, despite the language used therein, apparently did
not impose absolute liability on the negligent party in fall-down cases.
It should not be forgotten that the Court there did imply that a
jury finding of contributory negligence would be a defense; and in
Brown Hotel Co. v. Levitt,25 decided within a few months of Grey-
hound Terminal,2 6 the Court recognized yet another defense in these
cases. The plaintiff, while traversing a set of stairs on which no
bandrails were provided, fell after being struck from behind by an
unidentified person, who apparently (and coincidentally) was also in
the process of falling down the stairs. In finding for the defendant,
the Court cited Judge Cardozo's opinion in DeHaen v. Rockwood
Sprinkler Co.:27
Liability is not established by a showing that as chance would have it
a statutory safeguard might have avoided the particular hazard out of
which an accident ensued. The hazard out of which an accident ensued
must have been the particular hazard or class of hazards that the statutory
2220 R.C.L. 43 (1918).
23302 Ky. at 635, 195 S.W.2d at 279.
24307 Ky. 44, 209 S.W.2d 478 (1948).
25306 Ky. 804, 209 S.W.2d 70 (1948).26 The dissenting opinion in Blue Grass Restaurant argued that the Court
should have followecd Brown Hotel because it was decided on January 23, 1948
whereas Greyhound Terminal was decided on November 18, 1947. The dissenting
judges no doubt have access to information which is unavailable to this writer.
It should be noted, however, if only for the sake of argument, that January 23,
1948 was the date Brown Hotel was published. Greyhound Terminal was
published on March 26, 1948.
27258 N.Y. 350,- , 179 N.E. 764, 766 (1932).
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safeguard in the thought and purpose of the Legislature was intended to
correct. (Emphasis added.)28
Although the plaintiff in Brown Hotel testified that if there had been
a railing she could have taken hold of it, the Court rejected this con-
tention because at the time she was struck, her husband was right
beside her and she failed to take hold of him.
The Court in Blue Grass Restaurant relied on the decisions in
Durham and Greyhound Terminal and quoted from Durham the
passage which that Court had adopted from Ruling Case Law.29 The
Court emphasized the fact that there was no contention on the part
of the restaurant that its failure to provide the handrails was not
negligence per se, that Mr. Franklin testified that he had reached for
a handrail, and that the evidence was sufficient to support a jury
finding that Franklin was free from negligence.
The dissent argued that there was nothing particularly dangerous
about those steps and that since Mr. Franklin didn't know exactly
what caused him to fall, he should be held contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. Brown Hotel was cited as a more preferable precedent
for this case than Greyhound Terminal.30
The precise holding of the Court was:
The ordinance which was violated was intended to prevent the injury
which Franklin sustained, therefore, the failure to comply must be con-
sidered a proximate cause. Greyhound Terminal of Louisville v. Thomas,
.supra.
3 1
Although the Court cited Greyhound Terminal in making this state-
ment, it should be noted that instead of referring to the negligence
as the proximate cause, as was done in both Durham2 and Grey-
hound Terminal,33 the Court here referred to the negligence as a
proximate cause. It must be assumed that this variance in articles was
intentional and was a recognition that in this type of case more than
one proximate cause might exist. Although this would seem precluded
by the common law definition of proximate cause in Kentucky, it is
apparently not an unknown concept. At least one authority, concerning
the presence of negligence per se in fall-down cases, states: "..
28 806 Ky. at 808, 209 S.W.2d at 72 It is difficult to tell whether the Court
cited this quotation from Judge Cardozo to prove that the defendant's negligence
was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries because of the existence of an
intervening force, or to prove that the failure to provide handrails was not
negligence per se because the injury suffered was not within the contemplation
of the ordinance.
29 424 S.W.2d at 597.
30 Id. at 599-600.
31 Id. at 597.
32 302 Ky. at 635, 195 S.W.2d at 279.
83 307 Ky. at 46, 209 S.W.2d at 479.
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[W]hether or not an innkeeper's violation of such regulations imposes
liability for injuries to a guest depends upon whether the absence of
such handrails constitutes one of the proximate causes of the falling
and injury" 34 (Emphasis added.) This commentator does not discuss
what other possible causes might constitute "one of the proximate
causes." Neither does the Blue Grass Restaurant opinion indicate
what other factor, if found, might have been "a proximate cause." The
implication, however, is that if Mr. Franklin had been found con-
tributorily negligent, that would have been a proximate cause- one
which under existing Kentucky law would have barred recovery.85
At any rate, if the assumption now made as to the wording of the
holding in this case is correct, Blue Grass Restaurant may be foretelling
a change in Kentucky law regarding causation-if nothing else, it
further confuses the definitional distinctions between causes and
proximate causes.
If the assumption is incorrect, there can still be no quarrel with
the result of the case. The Kentucky law as expressed in Durham and
Greyhound Terminal, and as followed in Blue Grass Restaurant, is in
tune with the generally accepted maxim that when a statute or
ordinance designed for the safety of a specific class of individuals is
violated, the violator must accept responsibility for any resulting in-
jury to an innocent person which was within the legislative con-
templation.86 Professor Prosser goes so far as to say that even when
there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's conduct
to produce the result, the defendant will be held liable because his
negligence consists in the failure to protect the plaintiff against that
very risk-and cites cases from various jurisdictions in support of that
position.37 He does, however, recognize that there are legitimate de-
fenses to an action involving negligence per se.38 And so, apparently,
does Kentucky law. The implication in Blue Grass Restaurant was that
34Annot., 58 A.L.R. 2d 1195 (1958).
35 Kentucky has no comparative negligence statute.
86 See 88 Am. Jun. Negligence § 166 (1941) for the following:
If the injury complained of is a natural and probable consequence of
a violation of the statute, then that violation is correctly taken as the
proximate cause of the injury. If the very injury has happened which
was intended to be prevented by the statute law, that injury must be
considered as directly caused by the nonobservance of the law...
And see 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 105 (1966), which states:
The essence of proximate cause in cases involving the violation of
statutes is whether the risk and harm encountered fall within the scope
of the protection of the statute.... The negligent violation of a statutory
standard of care is usually the proximate cause of injury if the accident
occurring is the accident which the statute is designed to prevent.
8
7 W. ROSSEn, HANDBOOK or =r[ LAW oF TORTs § 51 (3d ed. 1964).
38 Id. at § 35.
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if Mr. Franklin had been found contributorily negligent, he would
have been barred from recovery just as were the plaintiffs in Seelbach,
Inc. v. Mellman8" and Tate v. Canary Cottage.40 Nor is there any reason
to believe that Blue Grass Restaurant in any way overruled Brown
Hotel in which the accident causing the injury was held not to have
been within the contemplation of the ordinance violated. Rather, it
must be said that the Court in Blue Grass Restaurant merely followed
existing Kentucky law as applied to its facts. Any criticism must be
directed at the unfortunate choice of words used in the one-sentence
holding, which, if taken out of context from the rest of the opinion,
would seem to imply that absolute liability was imposed.
William S. Cooper
WOcXMN'S COMPENSATIoN-"AisiG OuT OF" REQUImEMENT-OPER-
ANG PM Ms.s.-Plaintiff was employed in a hospital and covered by
the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act. She fell and was injured
one morning while walking toward the hospital from the hospital
parking lot where she had parked her car. The Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board denied her claim for compensation and plaintiff appealed to
the Harlan County Circuit Court. The decision was reversed by the
Circuit Court and the Board appealed to the Kentucky Court of Ap-
peals. Held: Affirmed. The parking lot was a part of the employer's
operating premises and the injury was therefore compensable. Harlan
Appalachian Regional Hospital v. Taylor, 424 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1968).
Kentucky's Workmen's Compensation Act requires that a com-
pensable injury arise "out of and in the course of ... [the employee's]
employment."' (Emphasis added) The development of this dual re-
quirement, as interpreted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals, has
followed a definite pattern.
The initial arise "out of' requirement has historically been linked
with causation and has been the primary test. In fact the second re-
quirement of arising "in the course of his employment" was often
dependent upon the first.2 In parking lot situations similar to that in
39 293 Ky. 790, 170 S.W.2d 18 (1948).
40 802 Ky. 813, 194 S.W.2d 663 (1946).
IKY. REv. STAT. [hereinafter cited as KRS] § 842.005(1) (1962).2 1n considering the principle behind the exceptions to the premises rule,
Larson says "in this instance, as in many others, the concept of 'course of employ-
ment' follows that of 'arising out of employment'; that is, the employment-con-
nected risk is first recognized, and then a course-of-employment theory must be
devised to permit compensation for that obviously occupational risk." 1 LARsoN,
WQaMN'S CONwEVNSATON LAW [hereinafter cited as LARsoN] § 15.15 (1965).
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